Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/216603
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dc.contributor.authorCouto, Diana-
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-19T10:27:18Z-
dc.date.available2024-11-19T10:27:18Z-
dc.date.issued2022-03-29-
dc.identifier.issn0167-7411-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/216603-
dc.description.abstractIn a couple of short papers, Donald Davidson holds that a creature cannot think unless it is the interpreter of the speech of another. At frst blush, speaking a language is, therefore, a necessary condition for thought. His controversial claims has led many to regard him as a follower of the Cartesian tradition wherein languageless creatures are nothing but mindless machines. Against this widely shared interpretation, in this paper we put forward a more charitable interpretation of Davidson’s claims. According to our reading, Davidson never meant to argue that languageless creatures do not think. Instead, the only thing his arguments purport to show is that one will never be in a position to confrm that they do. This paper consists of a defense of the idea that Davidson is better seen as endorsing radical skepticism as to whether languageless creatures think.-
dc.format.extent12 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.publisherSpringer Science + Business Media-
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09801-5-
dc.relation.ispartofTopoi. An International Review of Philosophy, 2022, vol. 41, num.3, p. 587-598-
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09801-5-
dc.rightscc by (c) Couto, Diana, 2022-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/*
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)-
dc.subject.classificationInterpretació (Filosofia)-
dc.subject.classificationFilosofia del llenguatge-
dc.subject.classificationPensament-
dc.subject.classificationCreença i dubte-
dc.subject.classificationTriangulació-
dc.subject.otherInterpretation (Philosophy)-
dc.subject.otherPhilosophy of language-
dc.subject.otherThinking-
dc.subject.otherBelief and doubt-
dc.subject.otherTriangulation-
dc.titleCan There be Thought Without Words?-Donald Davidson on Language and Animal Minds-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion-
dc.identifier.idgrec751532-
dc.date.updated2024-11-19T10:27:18Z-
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess-
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

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