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https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217321| Title: | School choice with farsighted students |
| Author: | Atay, Ata Mauleon, Ana Vannetelbosch, Vincent |
| Keywords: | Elecció d'escola Previsió social Assignació de recursos Anàlisi matemàtica School choice Social prediction Resource allocation Mathematical analysis |
| Issue Date: | 1-Jan-2025 |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| Abstract: | We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. How- ever, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already su cient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC. In addition, we show that variations of TTC that improve in terms of no justi ed envy are farsightedly stable, but may require more farsightedness on behalf of students. |
| Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010 |
| It is part of: | Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 149, num.January, p. 148-163 |
| URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217321 |
| Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.010 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
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Document embargat fins el
27-11-2027
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