Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/218675
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dc.contributor.authorChiappinelli, Olga-
dc.contributor.authorSeres, Gyula-
dc.date.accessioned2025-02-11T17:29:16Z-
dc.date.available2025-02-11T17:29:16Z-
dc.date.issued2024-05-01-
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/218675-
dc.description.abstractWe provide an auction-theoretical analysis of Green Public Procurement (GPP) as a preferential program aimed at stimulating investment in green technologies. We find that GPP incentivizes more competitive firms to invest. We also show that GPP can be an optimal mechanism for a procurer who cares about minimizing the purchasing price while triggering green investment.-
dc.format.extent4 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.publisherElsevier B.V.-
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111705-
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Letters, 2024, vol. 238, num.May, p. 1-4-
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111705-
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2024-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/*
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Economia)-
dc.subject.classificationPolítica ambiental-
dc.subject.classificationContractes administratius-
dc.subject.classificationSubhastes-
dc.subject.classificationPolítica de despesa pública-
dc.subject.otherEnvironmental policy-
dc.subject.otherPublic contracts-
dc.subject.otherAuctions-
dc.subject.otherGovernment spending policy-
dc.titleOptimal discounts in green public procurement-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion-
dc.identifier.idgrec748885-
dc.date.updated2025-02-11T17:29:16Z-
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess-
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)

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