Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/57175
Title: | One-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands |
Author: | Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) |
Keywords: | Venedors Agents comercials Economia de mercat Models economètrics Equilibri (Economia) Sales personnel Commercial agents Market economy Econometric models Equilibrium (Economics) |
Issue Date: | 2014 |
Publisher: | Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-Eco14/316] |
Abstract: | We consider one-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands and prove that the associated game is buyers-submodular. Therefore the core is non-empty and it has a lattice structure which contains the allocation where every buyer receives his marginal contribution. We prove that in this kind of market, every pairwise-stable outcome is associated to a competitive equilibrium and viceversa. We study conditions under which the buyers-optimal and the seller-optimal core allocations are competitive equilibrium payoff vectors. Moreover, we characterize the markets for which the core coincidences with the set of competitive equilibria payoff vectors. When agents behave strategically, we introduce a procedure that implements the buyers-optimal core allocation as the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ub.edu/ubeconomics/e14316-one-seller-assignment-markets-with-multiunit-demands/ |
It is part of: | UB Economics – Working Papers, 2014, E14/316 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/57175 |
ISSN: | 1136-8365 |
Appears in Collections: | UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE] Documents de treball / Informes (Economia) Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
E14-316_Robles.pdf | 571.08 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License