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Title: One-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands
Author: Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier
Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Keywords: Venedors
Agents comercials
Economia de mercat
Models economètrics
Equilibri (Economia)
Sales personnel
Commercial agents
Market economy
Econometric models
Equilibrium (Economics)
Issue Date: 2014
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-Eco14/316]
Abstract: We consider one-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands and prove that the associated game is buyers-submodular. Therefore the core is non-empty and it has a lattice structure which contains the allocation where every buyer receives his marginal contribution. We prove that in this kind of market, every pairwise-stable outcome is associated to a competitive equilibrium and viceversa. We study conditions under which the buyers-optimal and the seller-optimal core allocations are competitive equilibrium payoff vectors. Moreover, we characterize the markets for which the core coincidences with the set of competitive equilibria payoff vectors. When agents behave strategically, we introduce a procedure that implements the buyers-optimal core allocation as the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: UB Economics – Working Papers, 2014, E14/316
ISSN: 1136-8365
Appears in Collections:UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
Documents de treball / Informes (Economia)
Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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