Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/58886
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dc.contributor.authorJiménez González, Juan Luis-
dc.contributor.authorPerdiguero, Jordi-
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-22T08:14:48Z-
dc.date.available2014-10-22T08:14:48Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.issn2014-1254-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/58886-
dc.description.abstractCartel detection is one of the most basic and most complicated tasks of competition authorities. In recent years, however, variance filters have provided a fairly simple tool for rejecting the existence of price-fixing, with the added advantage that the methodology requires only a low volume of data. In this paper we analyze two aspects of variance filters: 1- the relationship established between market structure and price rigidity, and 2- the use of different benchmarks for implementing the filters. This paper addresses these two issues by applying a variance filter to a gasoline retail market characterized by a set of unique features. Our results confirm the positive relationship between monopolies and price rigidity, and the variance filter's ability to detect non-competitive behavior when an appropriate benchmark is used. Our findings should serve to promote the implementation of this methodology among competition authorities, albeit in the awareness that a more exhaustive complementary analysis is required.-
dc.format.extent40 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.publisherUniversitat de Barcelona. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública-
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2011/201120.pdf-
dc.relation.ispartofIREA – Working Papers, 2011, IR11/20-
dc.relation.ispartofseries[WP E-IR11/20]-
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Jiménez González et al., 2011-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/-
dc.sourceDocuments de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))-
dc.subject.classificationMercat-
dc.subject.classificationControl de preus-
dc.subject.classificationCompetència econòmica-
dc.subject.classificationGasolina-
dc.subject.otherMarket-
dc.subject.otherPrice control-
dc.subject.otherCompetition-
dc.subject.otherGasoline-
dc.titleDoes Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion?-
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper-
dc.date.updated2014-10-22T08:14:48Z-
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess-
Appears in Collections:Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))

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