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https://hdl.handle.net/2445/58886
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Jiménez González, Juan Luis | - |
dc.contributor.author | Perdiguero, Jordi | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-10-22T08:14:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-10-22T08:14:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 2014-1254 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/58886 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Cartel detection is one of the most basic and most complicated tasks of competition authorities. In recent years, however, variance filters have provided a fairly simple tool for rejecting the existence of price-fixing, with the added advantage that the methodology requires only a low volume of data. In this paper we analyze two aspects of variance filters: 1- the relationship established between market structure and price rigidity, and 2- the use of different benchmarks for implementing the filters. This paper addresses these two issues by applying a variance filter to a gasoline retail market characterized by a set of unique features. Our results confirm the positive relationship between monopolies and price rigidity, and the variance filter's ability to detect non-competitive behavior when an appropriate benchmark is used. Our findings should serve to promote the implementation of this methodology among competition authorities, albeit in the awareness that a more exhaustive complementary analysis is required. | - |
dc.format.extent | 40 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Universitat de Barcelona. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública | - |
dc.relation.isformatof | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2011/201120.pdf | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IREA – Working Papers, 2011, IR11/20 | - |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [WP E-IR11/20] | - |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Jiménez González et al., 2011 | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ | - |
dc.source | Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA)) | - |
dc.subject.classification | Mercat | - |
dc.subject.classification | Control de preus | - |
dc.subject.classification | Competència econòmica | - |
dc.subject.classification | Gasolina | - |
dc.subject.other | Market | - |
dc.subject.other | Price control | - |
dc.subject.other | Competition | - |
dc.subject.other | Gasoline | - |
dc.title | Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion? | - |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | - |
dc.date.updated | 2014-10-22T08:14:48Z | - |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | - |
Appears in Collections: | Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA)) |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IR11-020_Jimenez.pdf | 762.01 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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