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Institutional Determinants of Military Spending

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Drawing on a database for 1988-2006 containing information on 157 countries, we investigate the effects on military spending of government form, electoral rules, concentration of parliamentary parties, and ideology. From an OLS regression on pooled data, our results show that presidential democracies spend more than parliamentary systems on defense, whereas the presence of a plurality voting system will reduce the defense burden. Our findings suggest that, in contrast to theoretical predictions in the literature, institutions do not have the same impact on the provision of all public goods. We present as well evidence regarding the effect of ideology on defense spending.

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Universitat de Barcelona. Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública

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Documents de treball (Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública (IREA))

# metadata.dc.title[].value
Institutional Determinants of Military Spending