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Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games

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We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core. Replacing 'poorest' by 'poorer' allows to eliminate aggregate monotonicity. Moreover, we show that the egalitarian solution is characterized by constrained welfare egalitarianism and either bilateral consistency à la Davis and Maschler or, together with individual rationality, by bilateral consistency à la Hart and Mas-Colell.

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Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2021, vol. 95, num. 102477

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games