# name
Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets

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We consider a market comprising a number of perfectly complementary and homogeneous commodities. We concentrate on the incentives for firms producing these commodities to merge and form a vertical syndicate. The main result establishes that the nucleolus of the associated market game corresponds to the unique vector of prices with the following properties: (i) they are vertical syndication-proof, (ii) they are competitive, (iii) they yield the average of the buyers- and the sellers-optimal allocations in bilateral markets, and (iv) they depend on the traders' bargaining power but not on their identity. The proof uses an isomorphism between our class of market games and the entire class of bankruptcy games.

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

# metadata.dc.title[].value
Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets