# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
Some speech acts are made indirectly. It is thus natural to think that assertions could also be made indirectly. Grice's conversational implicatures appear to be just a case of this, in which one indirectly makes an assertion or a related constative act by means of a declarative sentence. Several arguments, however, have been given against indirect assertions, by Davis (1999), Fricker (2012), Green (2007, 2015), Lepore & Stone (2010, 2015) and others. This paper confronts and rejects three considerations that have been made: arguments based on the distinction between lying and misleading; arguments based on the ordinary concept of assertion; and arguments based on the testimonial knowledge that assertions provide.

# metadata.dc.relation.ispartof[].value
Philosophical Perspectives, 2018, vol. 32, num. 1, p. 188-218

# metadata.dc.source[].value
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)