# name
A Sociocultural Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value

# metadata.dc.description[].value
Màster en Filosofia Analítica (APhil), Facultat Filosofía, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2023-2024, Director/Tutor: Ryan P. Doran

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
Realist theories of value assert that evaluative truths exist independently of human minds. At
the same time, the content and formation of evaluative judgements are affected by
sociocultural forces. This thesis critically analyzes the compatibility of realist theories of value
with the influence of sociocultural forces on evaluative judgments. Realists must explain how
this culturally shaped evaluative content relates to the mind-independent evaluative truths
they posit. I argue that moral realists encounter a dilemma in reconciling the existence of
mind-independent evaluative truths with the influence of sociocultural forces on evaluative
judgements.
The dilemma presented in this thesis consists of two problematic pathways for realism. The
first option claims no relation between sociocultural influences and independent evaluative
truths. This leads to our evaluative judgments likely being distorted, and a skeptical view about
the ability to access true moral knowledge. On the other hand, realists can posit that
sociocultural evaluative judgments are aligned with independent truths. In that case, they
must account for how these judgments, which are shaped by diverse and often conflicting
cultural influences, reliably track objective moral facts. I conclude that they are not able to do
so, leaving the realist with no satisfactory account explaining the relation between
socioculturally shaped evaluative attitudes and mind-independent evaluative truth.

# metadata.dc.title[].value
A Sociocultural Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value