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The family of lattice structure values for games with externalities

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We propose and characterize a new family of Shapley values for games with coalitional externalities. To define it we generalize the concept of marginal contribution by using a lattice structure on the set of embedded coalitions. The family of lattice structure values is characterized by extensions of Shapley's axioms: efficiency, additivity, symmetry, and the null player property. The first three axioms have widely accepted generalizations to the framework of games with externalities. However, different concepts of null players have been proposed in the literature and we contribute to this debate with a new one. The null player property that we use is weaker than the others. Finally, we present one particular value of the family, new in the literature, which delivers balanced payoffs and characterize it by two additional properties.

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Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa

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UB Economics – Working Papers, 2018, E18/379

# metadata.dc.title[].value
The family of lattice structure values for games with externalities