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The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games

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Within the class of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility, the convexity of a game is characterized by the coincidence of its core and the steady bargaining set. As a consequence it is also proved that convexity can also be characterized by the coincidence of the core of a game and the modi ed Zhou bargaining set (Shimomura, 1997)

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International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, vol. 47, num. 1, p. 35-54

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games