# name
An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game [WP]

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graphtheoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-seller exact representative in Núñez and Rafels (2002)

# metadata.dc.publisher[].value
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa

# metadata.dc.relation.ispartof[].value
UB Economics – Working Papers, 2016, E16/350

# metadata.dc.title[].value
An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game [WP]