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Does Explaining Past Success Require (Enough) Retention? The Case Of Ptolemaic Astronomy

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According to selective, retentive, scientific realism, past empirical success may be  explained only by the parts of past theories that are responsible of their successful predic tions being approximately true, and thus theoretically retained, or approximated, by the  parts of posterior theories responsible of the same successful predictions. In this article, we  present as case study the transit from Ptolemy’s to Kepler’s astronomy, and their successful predictions for Mars’ orbit. We present an account of Ptolemy’s successful prediction of Mars’ orbit from Kepler’s perspective, and scrutinize whether the theoretical elements responsible for Ptolemy’s empirical success are approximately retained in Kepler. In order to give to the realist the best chances, we try different strategies. We conclude that all fail and thereby this case constitutes a prima facie strong anomaly for selective retentive realism. Structural realists may call preservation of structure to the rescue, but the existing notions of structure do not work. In absence of a new notion that works, the burden of the proof lies on the realist side.

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Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2022, vol. 2022, num.53, p. 323-344

# metadata.dc.rights[].value
cc by (c) Díez, José Antonio et al., 2022

# metadata.dc.source[].value
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

# metadata.dc.title[].value
Does Explaining Past Success Require (Enough) Retention? The Case Of Ptolemaic Astronomy