# name
Lògica intuïcionista. Teorema de Glivenko

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Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2021, Director: Joan Gispert Brasó

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
[en] Glivenko’s theorem says that the fact that a proposition is provable in classical logic is equivalent to the double negation of this proposition being provable in intuitionistic logic. We present the intuitionistic logic and introduce two syntactic calculus: the Hilbert calculus and the natural deduction calculus. We give as well two semantics for the intuitionistic logic. A relational one, based on Kripke models and an algebraic one, based
on Heyting algebras. To conclude we give three different proofs of Glivenko’s theorem. A syntactic one, a semantic one based on Kripke models and a semantic one based on Heyting algebras.

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cc-by-nc-nd (c) Genı́s Canal Ferrer, 2021

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Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Matemàtiques

# metadata.dc.title[].value
Lògica intuïcionista. Teorema de Glivenko