# name
Single-object auction analysis: theory and strategic bidding

# metadata.dc.description[].value
Treballs Finals del Doble Grau d'Administració i Direcció d'Empreses i de Matemàtiques, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa i Facultat de Matemàtiques i Informàtica, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2023-2024, Tutor: Josep Vives i Santa Eulàlia

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
[en] The main goal of this work is to discuss the most relevant aspects regarding single-object auction theory. In particular, principal types of single-object auctions, equilibrium strategies for each type, and variations on the proposed model are disclosed. In order to accomplish these aims, a brief summary of basic terms on game theory is provided in first place so as to set the foundations of auction theory. This preliminary summary includes a series of key results on game theory, allowing to use them as a tool to apply into auction theory and thus understand
the second part of the document.
Finally, a real example of an auction type is provided: the U.S Treasury Bill auction. Definitions, mechanisms and bidding behaviour are provided, along with a brief introduction to multi-object auctions.

# metadata.dc.rights[].value
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Esteve Vila Cortijo, 2024

# metadata.dc.source[].value
Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Administració i Direcció d’Empreses i Matemàtiques (Doble Grau)

# metadata.dc.title[].value
Single-object auction analysis: theory and strategic bidding