# name
Impact of the entrance of a new country into the European Union in the voting power in the Council of the EU

# metadata.dc.description[].value
Treballs Finals del Doble Grau d'Administració i Direcció d'Empreses i de Matemàtiques, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa i Facultat de Matemàtiques i Informàtica, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2022-2023, Tutor: Josep Vives i Santa Eulàlia, Mikel Álvarez-Mozos i Samer Ajour El Zein

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
[en] Power indexes are key indicators in game theory and allow us to measure the voting power of different agents in a voting system, also called a weighted majority game. If we look at the theory of cooperative games, we can find different indices that try to measure the voting power of the coalitions that can be formed between the various agents or players. In our case, we have focused on the study of the Shapley-Shubik index.
The objective of this work is to analyze the impact that the entry of new countries into the European Union would cause on the voting power within the Council of the European Union of the different member states. To do this, we analyzed the variations in the Shalpey-Shubik index of the EU member states as a result of the entry of new
countries in four different scenarios.

# metadata.dc.source[].value
Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Administració i Direcció d’Empreses i Matemàtiques (Doble Grau)

# metadata.dc.title[].value
Impact of the entrance of a new country into the European Union in the voting power in the Council of the EU