# name
The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominated
imputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem
1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms also
characterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balanced
games, and superadditive games

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
Aquest article proporciona un marc axiomàtic per a comparar el Cor de d (el joc d'imputacions indominades) i el cor d'un joc cooperatiu amb la utilitat trasferible. El teorema 1 estats que el Cor de d és l'única solució que satisfà la consistència de projecció, el raonable (des de dalt), (*)-*antimonotonicity, i la *modularitat. El teorema 2 caracteritza el substituir de cor (*)-*antimonotonicity per *antimonotonicity. A més, aquests axiomes també caracteritzen el cor sobre el domini de jocs convexs, jocs totalment equilibrats, jocs equilibrats, i jocs superadditius.

# metadata.dc.publisher[].value
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa

# metadata.dc.relation.ispartof[].value
Documents de treball (Facultat d'Economia i Empresa. Espai de Recerca en Economia), 2005, E05/144

# metadata.dc.title[].value
The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach