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Assortative multisided assignment games: the extreme core points

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We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players' abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained.

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Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 120, num. March, p. 144-153

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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Assortative multisided assignment games: the extreme core points