# name
Griffiths' psychoevolutionary theory of basic emotions: is the automatic appraisal mechanism informationally encapsulated?

# metadata.dc.description[].value
Màster en Filosofia Analítica (APhil), Facultat Filosofía, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2013-2014, Director/Tutor: David Pineda

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
Griffiths argues that a system which triggers the emotional response, named automatic appraisal
mechanism (AAM), is informationally encapsulated (Griffiths, 1997). After proposing a clarification
of the AAM using Shea's taxonomy (Shea, 2013), I will claim that Griffiths' inference to the best
explanation in favor of the informational encapsulation of the AAM is not compelling. I will present
empirical evidence (Paquette et al., 2003) that is incompatible with the thesis of the informational
encapsulation of the AAM in order to cast doubts on Griffiths' explanation, and I will propose an
alternative one. My alternative explanation will be that the AAM is synchronically impenetrable,
and I will affirm that it is preferable over Griffiths' one because is less theoretically demanding, and
moreover in accordance with empirical evidence that shows the possibility of diachronic cognitive
penetration of the AAM. I will conclude by claiming that this revision can provide also a better
account of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions.

# metadata.dc.title[].value
Griffiths' psychoevolutionary theory of basic emotions: is the automatic appraisal mechanism informationally encapsulated?