# name
Expert deference about the epistemic and its metaepistemological significance

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
This paper focuses on the phenomenon of forming one's judgement about epistemic matters, such as whether one has some reason not to believe false propositions, on the basis of the opinion of somebody one takes to be an expert about them. The paper pursues three aims. First, it argues that some cases of expert deference about epistemic matters are suspicious. Secondly, it provides an explanation of such a suspiciousness. Thirdly, it draws the metaepistemological implications of the proposed explanation.

# metadata.dc.relation.ispartof[].value
Canadian journal of philosophy, 2020, vol. 50, num. 4, p. 524-538

# metadata.dc.source[].value
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

# metadata.dc.title[].value
Expert deference about the epistemic and its metaepistemological significance