# name
When developers hold office: shaping housing supply through local politics

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
We examine the impact of city council members with real estate backgrounds on housing supply in California 1995-2019. Using candidate occupation data and a close-elections regression discontinuity design, we find that electing a developer increases approved housing units by 68% during their term. This effect fades after one term, suggesting developers influence zoning decisions more than long-term policy change. Analysis of votes extracted from council meetings shows they are especially effective in securing discretionary zoning approvals. Importantly, we find no evidence of electoral backlash, suggesting voters are generally supportive of housing expansion led by pro-development candidates.

# metadata.dc.source[].value
IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

# metadata.dc.title[].value
When developers hold office: shaping housing supply through local politics