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Economic Shocks, Mobilization, and Regional Elite Splits

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What are the origins of elite splits? Why do regional elites break away from central elites and develop regional parties? This paper contends that intra-elite differences are more likely to be politicized when an economic shock exacerbates pre-existing asymmetric economic preferences and disadvantaged elites can mobilize the electorate on the basis of identity. I employ constituency-level data from Catalonia spanning the late 19th and early 20th century to test which factors influenced regional elite decisions to form a regional elite political party. To understand elite divisions, I exploit a historical exogenous trade shock and its asymmetric impact within Catalonia, and the availability of identity-based mobilization agents. The results show that regional elite splits took place in areas more affected by the 1898 colonial trade shock and where elites had larger mobilization capacity.

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Articles publicats en revistes (Ciència Política, Dret Constitucional i Filosofia del Dret)

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Economic Shocks, Mobilization, and Regional Elite Splits