# name
Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong

# metadata.dc.contributor.author[].value
Botín Sanz de Sautuola Garcia, Marcelino

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
Russellian physicalism is becoming increasingly popular because it promises to
deliver what everybody wants, realism and physicalism about consciousness. But
Russellian physicalists are not the first to swear on “the promise”, standard TypeB physicalism is a less fanciful view that also claims to give everything and take
nothing. In this paper, I argue that our hopes should not be placed on Russellian
physicalism because, unlike Type-B physicalism, it cannot explain how phenomenal
concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties without weakening its
physicalist credentials. The revelation challenge shows that Russellian physicalism
is either committed to an anti-realist and self-defeating view of phenomenal concepts or it is physically unacceptable.

# metadata.dc.source[].value
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

# metadata.dc.title[].value
Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong