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De Se Attitudes: Indexicality, Communication, Phenomenology

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Màster en Filosofia Analítica (APhil), Facultat Filosofía, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2024-2025, Director/Tutor: Manuel García-Carpintero

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For some, de se attitudes, singular thoughts about oneself “as oneself”, pose a significant
philosophical problem. For others, they are an illusion, easily explained away along the same lines
that traditional propositional attitudes are accounted for. This essay lifts off from the assumption
that the de se effect is real and in need of an explanation other than the one given for traditional
propositional attitudes. I begin by giving an overview of the discussion around de se attitudes, from
John Perry’s seminal paper on the topic, which initiated much of the actual discussion, to the more
recent and sophisticated views that have developed since. Next, I plan to provide a short critical
assessment of Recanati’s (2016) mental file framework, García-Carpintero’s (2016, 2017) tokenreflexive
indexical model, and Guillot’s (2016) phenomenal model for the de se. I divide the
discussion into two separate axis, one concerning the communication of de se attitudes, and another
regarding their phenomenology. Ultimately, I want to argue that, while the mental file and indexical
models might be well suited to account for the linguistic aspect of de se attitudes and their
communication, an appeal to the phenomenology of thought, in particular de se thought, is crucial if
we want to understand the nature of such attitudes.

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De Se Attitudes: Indexicality, Communication, Phenomenology