# name
A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient when each sector of the three-sided market has two agents. Unlike the two-sided case, the union of the extended cores of all the -compatible subgames with respect to an optimal matching may not be a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set.

# metadata.dc.relation.ispartof[].value
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019, vol. 98, num. March, p. 10-14

# metadata.dc.source[].value
Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

# metadata.dc.title[].value
A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets