# name
Externalities and the (Pre)nucleolus in Cooperative Games

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In most economic applications of cooperative games, externalities prevail: the worth of a coalition depends on how the other players are organized. We show that there is a unique natural way of extending the prenucleolus to games with coalitional externalities. This is in contrast to the Shapley value and the core for which many  different extensions have been proposed.

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Mathematical Social Sciences, 2024, vol. 128, num.March, p. 10-15

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

# metadata.dc.title[].value
Externalities and the (Pre)nucleolus in Cooperative Games