# name
Myopic PPPs: Risk allocation and hidden liabilities for taxpayers and users [WP]

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
Drawing on evidence from three case studies, we show how the State’s Financial Liability has worked in assigning risk in large PPP contracts in Spain. Project failure and the concessionaires’ bankruptcy have resulted in the government having to assume heavy financial obligations, which have ultimately been absorbed by taxpayers and users. In contrast, Spain’s leading construction companies, which were also major investors in the concessionaires, have been able to minimize their risk. Myopic PPPs have been entered into based on the transference of liabilities to taxpayers and users, and the, consequent, minimization of risks for the main private investors.

# metadata.dc.publisher[].value
Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa. Economia i territori. Càtedra Pasqual Maragall

# metadata.dc.relation.ispartof[].value
Càtedra Pasqual Maragall d'Economia i Territori – Documents de treball, WP 02/2016

# metadata.dc.rights[].value
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Bel i Queralt et al., 2016

# metadata.dc.source[].value
Documents de Treball (Càtedra Pasqual Maragall d'Economia i Territori)

# metadata.dc.title[].value
Myopic PPPs: Risk allocation and hidden liabilities for taxpayers and users [WP]