# name
Intentional Is Not Voluntary: An Epistemic Approach

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Màster en Filosofia Analítica (APhil), Facultat Filosofía, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2021-2022, Director/Tutor: Josep Lluís Prades Celma

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While concepts such as intentional action, action done for reasons, or expressive
action have been the focus of much contemporary work in the philosophy
of action, the concept of voluntary action has not received as much attention in
the last century. So much so that the current bibliography about voluntariness
is rather scarce. An interesting exception can be found in the recent work of
John Hyman (2013, 2015, 2016), whose account of voluntariness is remarkably
aimed at rejecting what I will call the Intentional-Voluntary Sufficiency
Thesis (IVST henceforth):
IVST. For any act-description A and any agent S, if S A-s intentionally
then S also A-s voluntarily.
Hyman’s main argument against IVST concerns cases of action done under
compulsion that falls short of total control over the agent. The argument
goes as follows. If S consents to A-ing because she is compelled to do it by a
sufficiently grave threat, then S does not A voluntarily although she A-s

# metadata.dc.title[].value
Intentional Is Not Voluntary: An Epistemic Approach