# name
Problems for factive accounts of assertion

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
The knowledge account of assertion construes assertion as subject to constitutive norms. In its standard version, it combines a wide scope obligation not to assert p without knowing p, with narrow scope principles specifying conditions under which it is permissible to assert p, where the notions of obligation and permission are duals and behave uniformly for variable p. It is argued that, given natural assumptions about the logic of 'ought', the account proves incoherent. The argument generalizes to accounts that substitute other factive notions for knowledge. A recent non-standard version of the knowledge account employs proposition-relative norms and circumvents the problem. However, it still leads to intolerable combinations of verdicts. Again, the problem arises because knowledge is factive, and it generalizes to other factive notions. It is shown that non-factive accounts face none of the diagnosed difficulties and can do much of the explanatory work that the knowledge account is alleged to do.

# metadata.dc.source[].value
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

# metadata.dc.title[].value
Problems for factive accounts of assertion