# name
An agreeable collusive equilibrium in differential games with asymmetric players

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
We study a class of collusive equilibria in differential games with asymmetric players discounting the future at different rates. For such equilibria, at each moment, weights of players can depend on the state of the system. To fix them, we propose using a bargaining procedure according to which players can bargain again at every future moment. By choosing as threat point the feedback noncooperative outcome, the corresponding solution, if it exists, is agreeable. An exhaustible resource game illustrates the results.

# metadata.dc.relation.ispartof[].value
Operations Research Letters, 2020, vol. 48, num. 1, p. 4-8

# metadata.dc.source[].value
Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

# metadata.dc.title[].value
An agreeable collusive equilibrium in differential games with asymmetric players