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Modalized Robust Virtue Epistemology Defended

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Treballs Finals del Màster en Ciència Cognitiva i Llenguatge, Facultat de Filosofia, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2022-2023, Tutor: Fernando Broncano Berrocal

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This essay addresses one of the most central and longstanding problems in epistemology:
What is the nature of knowledge? According to robust virtue epistemology, which is a popular
answer to this problem, knowledge is explained solely by appealing to cognitive abilities, epistemic
competences, or intellectual virtues. In this essay, I defend a reliabilist and modalized version of
robust virtue epistemology. More specifically, the main thesis of this essay is that Mortini's (2022)
reformulation of the safety principle as "environment-relative safety", which is the best response to
Kelp's (2009; 2016; 2018) safety dilemma, makes robust virtue epistemology even more plausible.
In section 2, after the introduction, I will present Pritchard's defense of a modest (non-robust) virtue
epistemology based on the independence thesis. In section 3, Kelp's (2009; 2016; 2018) safety
dilemma, which is an objection to the necessity of safety for knowledge, is presented. However, I
will argue that Mortini's (2022) reformulation of safety satisfactorily answers this objection and that
it is the best answer to this dilemma thus far in the literature. Finally, in section 4, I argue that the
manifestation of cognitive abilities ought to be relativized to actual features of the environment.
And I will argue that the satisfaction of the ability condition relativized to those features entails the
satisfaction of environment-relative safety.

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Màster Oficial - Ciència Cognitiva i Llenguatge (CCiL)

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Modalized Robust Virtue Epistemology Defended