# metadata.dc.description[].value
Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2019, Director:  F. Javier Martínez de Albéniz

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
[en] This work is an overview of Social Choice Theory. Social Choice Theory is a theoretical framework to analyse the combination of individual preferences and interests of a collectivity to reach a collective decision. For example, we could have a group of people choosing between budgets, or electing a candidate for an
organization.
We deep dive into Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems, which give us two impossibility results. They give some conditions for which it is impossible to implement a “reasonable” voting system. We also look at the simple majority rule and single-peaked preferences. That gives a sense of the conditions we should have so the voting system provides a fairer output.

# metadata.dc.rights[].value
cc-by-nc-nd (c) Ander Castillo i Figueras, 2019

# metadata.dc.source[].value
Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Matemàtiques