# name
The Banzhaf Value in the Presence of Externalities [WP]

# metadata.dc.description.abstract[].value
[eng] We propose two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for partition function form games. In both cases, our approach is based on probability distributions over the set of possible coalition structures that may arise for any given set of agents. First, we introduce a family of values, one for each collection of the latter probability distributions, defined as the Banzhaf value of an expected coalitional game. Then, we provide two characterization results for this new family of values within the framework of all partition function games. Both results rely on a property of neutrality with respect to amalgamation of players. Second, as this collusion transformation fails to be meaningful for simple games in partition function form, we propose another generalization of the Banzhaf value which also builds on probability distributions of the above type. This latter family is characterized by means of a neutrality property which uses an amalgamation transformation of players for which simple games are closed.

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Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa

# metadata.dc.relation.ispartof[].value
UB Economics – Working Papers, 2014, E14/302

# metadata.dc.rights[].value
cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Álvarez-Mozos et al., 2014

# metadata.dc.title[].value
The Banzhaf Value in the Presence of Externalities [WP]