# name
Arithmetic Judgements, First-Person Judgements and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification

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The paper explores the idea that some singular judgements about the natural numbers are immune to error through misidentification by pursuing a comparison between arithmetic judgements and first-person judgements. By doing so, the first part of the paper offers a conciliatory resolution of the Coliva-Pryor dispute about so-called "de re" and "which-object" misidentification. The second part of the paper draws some lessons about what it takes to explain immunity to error through misidentification. The lessons are: First, the so-called Simple Account (see Wright 2012) of whichobject immunity to error through misidentification to the effect that a judgement is immune to this kind of error just in case its grounds do not feature any identification component fails. Secondly, wh-immunity can be explained by a Reference-Fixing Account to the effect that a judgement is immune to this kind of error just in case its grounds are constituted by the facts whereby the reference of the concept of the object which the judgement concerns is fixed. Thirdly, a suitable revision of the Simple Account explains the de re immunity of those arithmetic judgements which are not 2 wh-immune. These three lessons point towards the general conclusion that there is no unifying explanation of de re and wh-immunity

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Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2018, vol. 10, num. 1, p. 155-172

# metadata.dc.source[].value
Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

# metadata.dc.title[].value
Arithmetic Judgements, First-Person Judgements and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification