Jarque i Ribera, XavierMartínez de Albéniz, F. JavierFernández Acacio, Vı́ctor2022-04-202022-04-202021-06https://hdl.handle.net/2445/185010Treballs Finals del Doble Grau d'Administració i Direcció d'Empreses i de Matemàtiques, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa i Facultat de Matemàtiques i Informàtica, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2020-2021 , Tutor: Xavier Jarque i Ribera i F. Javier Martínez de Albéniz[en] The multiple-object auctions have risen in interest, that is because of the growing interest since the nineties in economy. We are in the middle of a multiple-object auction when multiple identical units are being sold. Firstly, we study the auctions of an object with private values. After classifying the different formats of auctions, we analyse if they are efficient, in other words, if the auction winner is the one who values the object the most. Secondly, we analyse the multiple-object auctions with private values. We will classify the three formats of auction. Then, as we did in the first chapter, we analyse which of these formats are efficient. Lastly, we study the electricity market. In the first half we introduce the Spanish electricity market and in the end we study a model of that type of multiple-object auctions.46 p.application/pdfcatcc-by-nc-nd (c) Vı́ctor Fernández Acacio, 2021http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/SubhastesEconomia matemàticaJocs no cooperatius (Matemàtica)Treballs de fi de grauPolítica energèticaAuctionsMathematical economicsNoncooperative games (Mathematics)Bachelor's thesesEnergy policyinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess