Rossi, NiccolòRosenkranz, Sven2025-07-232025-07-232024-06-241742-3600https://hdl.handle.net/2445/222529It is natural to assume that knowledge, like belief, creates a hyperintensional context, that is, that knowledge ascriptions do not allow for substitution of necessarily equivalent prejacents salva veritate. There exist a variety of different proposals for modelling the phenomenon. In the last years, the topic-sensitive approach to the hyperintensionality of knowledge has gained considerable traction. It promises to provide a natural account of why knowledge fails to be closed under necessary equivalence in terms of differences in subject matter. Here, we argue that the topic-sensitive approach, as recently put forward by Franz Berto, Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün, and others, faces formidable problems. The root of these problems lies in the approach’s prediction that a mere grasp of subject matter may help to provide insights into necessary implications that it would seem to require more substantive epistemic work to gain.14 p.application/pdfengcc by (c) Rossi, Niccolò et al., 2025http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/Sensibilitat (Psicologia)Teoria del coneixementEpistemologia genèticaHipertensióFilosofiaLògicaSensitivity (Personality trait)Theory of knowledgeGenetic epistemologyHypertensionPhilosophyLogicinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article7516182025-07-23info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess