Fleckinger, PierreGlachant, MatthieuTamokoué Kamga, Paul-Hervé2018-10-102018-10-102018https://hdl.handle.net/2445/125238In the European Union, Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) provide potential buyers or tenants with information on a property's energy performance. By mitigating informational asymmetries on real estate markets, the conventional wisdom is that they will reduce energy use, increase energy-efficiency investments, and improve social welfare. We develop a dynamic model that partly contradicts these predictions. Although EPCs always improve social welfare, their impact on energy use and investments is ambiguous. This implies that, in a second-best world where energy externalities are under-priced and/or homeowners have behavioral biases hindering investments (myopia), EPCs can damage social welfare. This calls for using mandatory energy labeling in contexts where additional instruments efficiently mitigate the other imperfections.28 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd, (c) Fleckinger et al., 2018http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/Distribució d'energia elèctricaEficiència industrialEtiquetatgeElectric power distributionIndustrial efficiencyLabelingEnergy performance certificates and investments in building energy efficiency: a theoretical analysisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess