García-Carpintero, Manuel2020-03-312020-12-312018-12-311520-8583https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154486Some speech acts are made indirectly. It is thus natural to think that assertions could also be made indirectly. Grice's conversational implicatures appear to be just a case of this, in which one indirectly makes an assertion or a related constative act by means of a declarative sentence. Several arguments, however, have been given against indirect assertions, by Davis (1999), Fricker (2012), Green (2007, 2015), Lepore & Stone (2010, 2015) and others. This paper confronts and rejects three considerations that have been made: arguments based on the distinction between lying and misleading; arguments based on the ordinary concept of assertion; and arguments based on the testimonial knowledge that assertions provide.31 p.application/pdfeng(c) John Wiley & Sons, 2018Filosofia del llenguatgeSemàntica (Filosofia)Philosophy of languageSemantics (Philosophy)info:eu-repo/semantics/article6831722020-03-31info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess