Fiva, Jon H.Natvik, Gisle James2017-10-242017-10-242009https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116996We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers’ re-election probabilities and explore empirically how this variation affects their investments in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This aligns with a theoretical framework where political parties disagree about which públic goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital.54 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd, (c) Fiva et al., 2009http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/Política econòmicaSociologia electoralInversionsEconomic policyVoting researchInvestmentsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess