Martínez de Albéniz, F. JavierRafels, Carles2016-12-022016-12-022014-010166-218Xhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/104406We study inverse-Monge assignment games, namely cooperative assignment games in which the assignment matrix satisfies the inverse-Monge property. For square inverse-Monge assignment games, we describe their cores and we obtain a closed formula for the buyers-optimal and the sellers-optimal core allocations. We also apply the above results to solve the non-square case.9 p.application/pdfeng(c) Elsevier B.V., 2014Funcions de variables realsAssignació de recursosMatemàtica financeraTeoria de jocsFunctions of real variablesResource allocationBusiness mathematicsGame theoryCooperative assignment games with the inverse Monge propertyinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article6282322016-12-02info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess