Atay, Ata2023-06-192023-06-192017-05-010167-6377https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their proof makes use of graph-theoretical tools, the alternative proof presented here relies on the notion of the buyer-seller exact representative, as introduced by Núñez and Rafels in 2002.3 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2017https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Teoria de jocsAssignació de recursosÀlgebres de Von NeumannProblema de NeumannGame theoryResource allocationVon Neumann algebrasNeumann probleminfo:eu-repo/semantics/article7168422023-06-19info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess