Esteller Moré, AlejandroGalmarini, UmbertoRizzo, Leonzio2017-09-142017-09-142015https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115376We examine the design of fiscal equalization transfers aimed at interregional redistribution in a setting in which special interest groups distort the fiscal policies of local governments. Equity always calls for tax-base equalization while efficiency calls for tax-base equalization of fiscal capacities backed by strong lobby groups and for taxrevenue equalization of those backed by weak lobby groups. Hence, it is optimal to rely only on tax-base equalization if the special interest groups are similar in terms of lobbying power, whereas a mixed system is optimal if they are highly heterogeneous. Tax competition reinforces the role of tax-base, while tax exporting that of tax-revenue, fiscal equalization.37 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd, (c) Esteller Moré et al., 2015http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/Política fiscalImpostosDistribució (Teoria de la probabilitat)Fiscal policyTaxationDistribution (Probability theory)info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess