Izquierdo Aznar, Josep MariaRafels, Carles2017-12-192017-12-1920171136-8365https://hdl.handle.net/2445/118810We study resource-monotonicity properties of core allocations in coinvestment problems: those where a set of agents pool their endowments of a certain resource or input in order to obtain a joint surplus or output that must be allocated among the agents. We analyze whether agents have incentives to raise their initial contribution (resource-monotonicity). We focus not only on looking for potential incentives to agents who raise their contributions, but also in not harming the payoffs to the rest of agents (strong monotonicity property). A necessary and suficient condition to fulfill this property is stated and proved. We also provide a subclass of coinvestment problems for which any core allocation satisfies the aforementioned strong resource-monotonicity property. Moreover, we introduce the subset of core allocations satisfying this condition, namely the incentive core.26 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd, (c) Izquierdo Aznar et al., 2017http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/Teoria de jocsAssignació de recursosModels matemàticsEstudis de viabilitatGame theoryRessource allocationMathematical modelsFeasibility studiesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper2017-12-19info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess