Domènech i Gironell, GerardNúñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)2023-01-232023-01-232022-110899-8256https://hdl.handle.net/2445/192490In the multiple-partners job market, introduced in (Sotomayor, 1992), each firm can hire several workers and each worker can be hired by several firms, up to a given quota. We show that, in contrast to what happens in the simple assignment game, in this extension, the firms-optimal stable rules are neither valuation monotonic nor pairwise monotonic. However, we show that the firms-optimal stable rules satisfy a weaker property, what we call firm-covariance, and that this property characterizes these rules among all stable rules. This property allows us to shed some light on how firms can (and cannot) manipulate the firms-optimal stable rules. In particular, we show that firms cannot manipulate them by constantly over-reporting their valuations. Analogous results hold when focusing on the workers. Finally, we extend to the multiple-partners market a known characterization of the fair-division rules on the domain of simple assignment games.16 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2022http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/Teoria de jocsEstadística matemàticaAssignació de recursosMercat de treballGame theoryMathematical statisticsResource allocationLabor marketinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article7282822023-01-23info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess