Piolatto, AmedeoTrotin, Gwenola2017-03-282018-03-012016-021097-3923https://hdl.handle.net/2445/108982Prospect Theory (PT) has become the most accepted alternative to Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as a theory of decision under uncertainty. This paper extends the existing literature on efficient tax and audit schemes, by answering the question as to just how progressive an efficient tax system can be when assuming that taxpayers behave in line with the tenets of PT. Under reasonable assumptions regarding the reference income and the value function of taxpayers, we show that the efficient tax schedule is regressive while audit probabilities are non-increasing in the declared income. These results are consistent with the previous literature on EUT13 p.application/pdfeng(c) Wiley, 2016Frau fiscalFrau de lleiImpostos sobre la rendaPerspectivaControl de gestióTax evasionEvasion of the lawIncome taxPerspectiveManagement auditOptimal income tax enforcement under prospect theoryinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article6529012017-03-28info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess