García-Carpintero, Manuel2024-03-182024-03-1820230165-0157https://hdl.handle.net/2445/208927We intuitively make a distinction between lying and misleading. On the explanation of this phenomenon favored here—the adverbial account—the distinction tracks whether the content and its truth-committing force are literally conveyed. On an alternative commitment account, the difference between lying and misleading is predicated instead on the strength of assertoric commitment. One lies when one presents with full assertoric commitment what one believes to be false; one merely misleads when one presents it without full assertoric commitment, by merely hinting or otherwise implying it. Now, as predicted by the well-supported assumption that we can also assert with pictures, the lying/misleading distinction appears to intuitively show up there too. Here I’ll explain how the debate confronting the two accounts plays out both in general and in that case, aiming to provide support for the adverbial account.24 p.application/pdfengcc-by (c) García-Carpintero, Manuel, 2023http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/Pragmàtica (Lingüística)ImatgesSemànticaVeritat i mentidaEnganyPragmaticsPicturesSemanticsTruthfulness and falsehoodDeceptioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/article7428592024-03-18info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess