Izquierdo Aznar, Josep MariaRafels, Carles2018-02-262019-12-3120180020-7276https://hdl.handle.net/2445/120240Within the class of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility, the convexity of a game is characterized by the coincidence of its core and the steady bargaining set. As a consequence it is also proved that convexity can also be characterized by the coincidence of the core of a game and the modi ed Zhou bargaining set (Shimomura, 1997)20 p.application/pdfeng(c) Springer Verlag, 2018Teoria de jocsAssignació de recursosFuncions convexesGame theoryResource allocationConvex functionsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article6753992018-02-26info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess