Toribio Mateas, Josefa2017-01-302017-01-3020180039-7857https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106208According to so-called 'thin' views about the content of experience, we can only visually experience low-level features such as colour, shape, texture or motion. According to so-called 'rich' views, we can also visually experience some high-level properties, such as being a pine tree or being threatening. One of the standard objections against rich views is that high-level properties can only be represented at the level of judgment. In this paper, I first challenge this objection by relying on some recent studies in social vision. Secondly, I tackle a different but related issue, namely, the idea that, if the content of experience is rich, then perception is cognitively penetrable. Against this thesis, I argue that the very same criteria that help us vindicate the truly sensory nature of our rich experiences speak against their being cognitively penetrable.application/pdfeng(c) Springer Verlag, 2018Filosofia de l'artPhilosophy of the artinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article6546222017-01-30info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess