Gamalerio, MatteoLuca, MarioRomarri, AlessioViskanic, Max2024-06-132024-06-132023-05-010166-0462https://hdl.handle.net/2445/213002We use data from Italy to study the political and social impact of a refugee reception policy (SPRAR) directly managed by local governments, whose features recall the conditions of the contact theory (Allport, 1954). Instrumental variables estimates indicate that municipalities that opened a refugee center between the 2013 and 2018 national elections experienced a change in the vote shares of extreme-right parties that is approximately 7 percentage points lower compared to municipalities that did not open a refugee center. We document that the positive impact of SPRARs on ‘‘compositional amenities’’ (i.e., local schools) and population growth allows explaining the negative impact on anti-immigrant prejudice. Finally, we provide evidence of spillovers in prejudice reduction in neighboring municipalities without a SPRAR.17 p.application/pdfengcc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2023http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/Eleccions localsExtrema dretaItàliaRefugiatsPartits políticsLocal electionsright-wing extremistsItalyRefugeesPolitical partiesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article7440692024-06-13info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess